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RATCHET PLUS? POSSIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT OF 1993
In Employment Division v. Smith' the Supreme Court ended almost
three decades of free exercise2 jurisprudence and eliminated a substantial
part of the First Amendment's protective power. The decision sent
shockwaves through the legal community. A large group of law
professors and religious groups petitioned the Court for a rehearing.3
The Court refused4 and immediately afterwards, a bill appeared in each
chamber of Congress that purported to reverse the Smith decision.' In
late 1993, President Clinton signed the culmination of this legislative
effort, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (the RFRA).6
1. 494 U.S. 872, reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). For a discussion of Smith, see
infra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
2. The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1411 n.25 (1992). The group was comprised of over
fifty legal scholars including Gerald Gunther, Kent Greenawalt, Michael McConnell, and
Laurence Tribe, as well as many diverse public interest and religious groups. Id.
4. 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
5. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 1411 (citing H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2cd Sess. (1990);
S. 3254, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)).
6. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-
4 (Supp. V 1993). The RFRA provides:
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(a) The Congress finds that -
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)[,] the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens
on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.
(b) The purposes of this Act are -
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Vemr,,374
U.S. 398 (1963)[,] and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)[,] and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government
§ 2000bb-1. Free Exercise of Religion Protected
(a) Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
(c) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this
section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in ajudicial proceeding and
obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or
defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under
article [sic] HI of the Constitution.
" 2000bb-3. Applicability
(a) This chapter applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of
that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after
November 16, 1993.
(b) Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993 is subject to this
chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this
chapter.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any government to
burden any religious belief.
§ 2000bb-4. Establishment clause unaffected
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The RFRA outlines the congressional interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause and instructs courts to revert to a pre-Smith interpreta-
tion of the Clause." Since Marbury v. Madison,9 however, it has been
the judiciary's prerogative to interpret the Constitution, not the legisla-
ture's.'0 This Recent Development explores Congress' constitutional
authority to enact the RFRA and whether that authority further empowers
Congress to interpret the Free Exercise Clause more expansively than the
Supreme Court.
Part I of this Recent Development reviews Free Exercise jurispru-
dence during the past thirty years. Part H examines three possible
sources of Congress' power to enact the RFRA, which altered existing
constitutional law. Finally, Part I concludes that the RFRA is a sound
and valid exercise of legislation to undo a restrictive constitutional
decision.
I. FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 1963-1993: FROM
COMPELLING INTEREST TO DEFERENCE
A. The Sherbert Era
For almost three decades, courts analyzed free exercise claims under
the test articulated in Sherbert v. Verner." In Sherbert, a member of
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address
that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of
religion (referred to in this section as the "Establishment Clause"). Granting
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the
Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter. As used in this
section, the term "granting", used with respect to government funding, benefits, or
exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or
exemptions.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4; see Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious
Practices, N.Y. TIMFs, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (Supp. V 1993).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (stating that the purpose of the
act is to restore the pre-Snith interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause); see supra note
6 for the text of the statute.
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (announcing the principle that the Court must apply
the Constitution in determining the validity of statutes).
10. But see infra notes 69-122 and accompanying text (discussing the "ratchet" theory,
under which Congress can interpret the Constitution to create greater rights than those
recognized under judicial interpretations).
11. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was discharged from her employment
when she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath according to her
religion.12 She filed for unemployment compensation benefits under the
South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act 3 with the state
Employment Security Commission.1 4  The commission denied her
benefits because it found that her refusal to work on Saturday constituted
a refusal to accept suitable work from her employer, an act that was
grounds for exclusion under the statute. 5
Sherbert appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging
the commission's denial on the grounds that it infringed upon her right
to free exercise of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.' 6 The state supreme court held that the commission's denial of
unemployment benefits did not impermissibly burden her right to free
exercise of religion. 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding the application
of the statute invalid under a two part balancing test." First, the Court
announced that a party claiming a religious exemption must show that
the challenged statute imposes a burden on the free exercise of his or her
religion.' Then, if such a burden is found, the Court concluded that
the statute would only be upheld if a state interest justified the infringe-
ment.2" The Court implied that a challenged statute's burden upon the
12. Id. at 399. The challenger sought other work in the area but could find none that
did not require her to work on Saturdays. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-27-10 to 41-50 (Law Co-op. 1986), formerly S.C. CODE,
tit. 68, §§ 68-1 to 68-404 (1962).
The Act disqualified an applicant for benefits if the Unemployment Commission found
that he or she "has failed, without good cause,.. . to accept available suitable work when
offered to him by... [an] employer .... " 374 U.S. at 400 n.3 (quoting S.C. CODE tit.
68, § 68-114).
14. 374 U.S. at 400-01.
15. Id. at 401; see supra note 13 (discussing the statutory exclusion).
16. Sherbert v. Verner, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962). The Free Exercise Clause applies to
state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
17. 125 S.E.2d at 746.
18. 374 U.S. at 403, 410.
19. Id. at 403.
20. Id. In its analysis of the state's interest, the Court considered the possible effects
of the state recognizing "religious objections to Saturday work," and concluded that the
state's fears of fraudulent claims of such objections were unwarranted. Id. at 407. Justice
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challenger's exercise of religion must be balanced against the state's
interest and the degree to which that interest would be undermined by
accommodating the challenger's religious practices."
From 1963 to 1990, the Supreme Court, although not overruling
Sherbert,z2 often ruled against parties claiming religious exemptions
from statutes of general applicability.' Only in two areas did the Court
consistently rule in favor of people invoking their rights to free exercise
of religion: unemployment benefits eligibility and compulsory school
attendance.24
The Supreme Court has, in two cases, defined the scope of religious
practices and beliefs protected under Sherbert. In Thomas v. Review
Board,25 the Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits to a
Jehovah's Witness who quit his job to avoid manufacturing weapons
violated the Free Exercise Clause.' The Supreme Court of Indiana
found that Thomas' beliefs were not religiously based.27 The United
Brennan's opinion fbr the Court further noted that even if recognizing religious objections
to Saturday work had a detrimental effect on the state's interest in avoiding fraud, the state
would be required to "demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat
such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." Id.
21. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.8, at 1221
(4th ed. 1991).
22. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (citing
the Sherbert line of opinions but concluding that the asserted government interest was
sufficiently compelling); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) ("The state
may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish
an overriding governmental interest."). But cf Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-53 (1988) (holding the Sherbert test inapplicable to
the particular facts); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 (1986) (same); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (holding the Sherbert test inapplicable and
adopting a "far more deferential" standard of review for military regulations).
23. See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (upholding Forest Service's plan to build a road
through, and to permit timber harvesting in, an area that was sacred to several Native
American tribes); Bowen, 476 U.S. 693 (rejecting parents' argument that they should not
be required to disclose their daughter's social security number to the government when
they believed that to do so would rob their child of her soul); Bob Jones University, 461
U.S. 574 (upholding IRS's denial of tax exempt status to a university that practiced racial
discrimination in accordance with its religious beliefs); Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (requiring the
Amish to pay social security taxes).
24. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 17.8 at 1221-29.
25. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
26. Id. at 720.
27. Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979).
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
348 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 48:343
States Supreme Court reversed, ruling that courts should not inquire into
the substance of an individual's religious beliefs.2" The Court reaf-
firmed Sherbert and Thomas in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission29 and extended the holdings in the earlier cases to protect
a person denied unemployment benefits for losing a job as a result of
religious practices acquired after accepting employment."
Wisconsin v. Yoderl was the only case not involving unemploy-
ment benefits in which the Supreme Court found that a party's free
exercise interest outweighed the state's interest. In Yoder, members of
the Amish religion challenged Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance
statute' on the grounds that their religion forbade formal education
28. 450 U.S. at 714. ("[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent,
or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection."). Id. The
Court further held that "[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because
the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not
articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ."
Id. at 715.
29. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
30. Id. at 139-140. The majority also explicitly rejected the Florida Appeals Commis-
sion's invitation to overturn the Sherbert test, or, in the alternative, adopt the less rigorous
standard articulated in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Bowen v. Roy, 467 U.S. 693, 707-
08 (1986). 480 U.S. at 141-42. Under Burger's test, "[Tihe Government meets its burden
when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and
uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest."
Id. at 141 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 707-08). Such an approach, the majority
opinion noted, would ignore precedent and relegate the First Amendment to the minimal
level of scrutiny already afforded by the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 141-42 (quoting
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 727 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In other words, the Hobble majority felt that
by reducing the affirmative power of the Free Exercise Clause to that of the Equal
Protection Clause, Burger's approach would essentially render the Free Exercise Clause
meaningless.
Three years after Hobble, the Supreme Court effectively, though not explicitly, adopted
Burger's test in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a discussion of
Smith, see infra part I.B.
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(1)(a) (West 1991). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
[A]ny person having under control a child who is between the ages of 6 and 18 years
shall cause the child to attend school regularly during the full period and hours,
religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which the child
should be enrolled is in session ....
Id.
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beyond the eighth grade.33 The Court employed the Sherbert balancing
tese and concluded that the Free Exercise Clause forbade the state to
compel the Amish from sending their children to high school. s
Furthermore, the Court noted that the statute also infringed upon the
Amish parents' right to control the upbringing of their children.36
Lower courts during the Sherbert era rarely found that government
action violated the Free Exercise Clause." Thus, in cases not involving
compulsory education laws or unemployment benefits laws, the Sherbert
test in practice provided a small safeguard against regulations of general
applicability that infringed upon an individual's religious practices.
B. Employment Division v. Smith
The Supreme Court in Smith3" partially overruled Sherbert,
abandoning its balancing tests in certain circumstances.39 Smith arose
in the context of unemployment benefits, but unlike Sherbert,40
Thomas, 41 and Hobbie,42 the Court denied the party's claim of a free
exercise exemption. '
In Smith, supervisors fired two Native Americans from their jobs at
a drug rehabilitation program because they ingested peyote during a
33. 406 U.S. 207-09.
34. Id. at 214-15; see supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text (describing Sherbert).
35. Id. at 234.
36. Id. at 232-34; see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing
parents' right to control their childrens' upbringing); see also infra note 51 (discussing
parents' continuing rights to control their childrens' educations).
37. Federal appeals courts rejected 85 of 97 free exercise claims brought from 1980
until the Smith decision in 1990. Ryan, supra note 3, at 1417; see also id. at 1459-62
(listing all such cases). This pattern mirrors the findings of studies of free exercise claims
in the courts of appeal between 1944 and 1981. Ryan, supra note 3, at 1417 n.63 (citing
EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 625-29 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989)).
38. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
39. See infra note 51 (describing limits on Smith).
40. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
43. 494 U.S. at 890.
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religious ceremony." The Oregon Employment Division determined
that because possession of peyote is a felony under Oregon law,4 the
plaintiffs engaged in misconduct, and should be denied unemployment
benefits.46
Although not explicitly overruling Sherbert, the majority declined
to employ the Sherbert balancing test.' Instead, the Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause does not stand in the way of otherwise valid,
neutral laws of general applicability, even if a particular law has the
effect of interfering with an individual's religious practices.41 Practical-
ly, this amounted to a per se validity rule for any generally applicable
law challenged under the Free Exercise Clause." The Court left
accommodation of religious practices to the political process by
suggesting that religions petition legislatures for religious exemptions to
44. Id. at 874. Peyote is a hallucinogen derived from the plant Lophophora Wtllamslt
Lemaire. Id.
45. Id., citing ORE. REv. STAT. § 475.992 (4)(a) (1987) (classifying possession of
controlled substance as a felony); OR. ADMiN. R. 855-80-021(3)(s) (1988) (listing peyote
as a controlled substance).
46. 494 U.S. at 874.
47. 494 U.S. at 876, 884-85. "Although ... we have sometimes used the Sherbert test
to analyze free exercise challenges to such laws.., the sounder approach.., is to hold
the test inapplicable to [challenges of across-the-board criminal prohibitions]." Id. at 884-
85. The majority continued its criticism of the test: "To make an individual's obligation
to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except
where the State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to
become a law unto himself,'. . . - contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense." Id. at 885 (quoting Reynold v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
48. 494 U.S. at 879. "ITihe right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the grounds
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."'
Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment)).
49. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 221, 226 (1993) [hereinafter Laycock, RFRA] ("There is simply no substantive
constitutional right to religious liberty after Smith.').
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol48/iss1/12
RATCHET PLUS?
statutes." With a few exceptions,5' the Smith Court eliminated what
50. 494 U.S. at 890. The majority noted that leaving religious freedom to the political
process:
[Will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferable to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.
Id.
51. First, the Smith Court carefully limited its holding to otherwise valid laws of
general application. 494 U.S. at 878-80. The test does not apply to those cases where
government regulates religious beliefs directly. Id. at 876-80; see Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
402 (noting that the Free Exercise Clause forbids "governmental regulation of religious
beliefs as such'). Therefore, government may not require affirmation of a particular
religious beliet penalize expression of religious doctrine it believes to be false, impose
disabilities on the basis of religious belief, or take sides in a religious controversy. 494
U.S. at 877; see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a state law
prohibiting ministers from serving in the legislature); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976) (prohibiting judicial interference with
internal church affairs); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969) (holding that the courts
cannot determine ecclesiastical questions); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
(holding that a state may not deny public office based on a refusal to affirm a belief in
God); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (invalidating a statute as applied
to single out a particular religion); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95-119
(1952) (invalidating a regulation of religious organizations); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (holding that the issue of the truth of religious beliefs was properly
excluded from a trial). Furthermore, free exercise challenges to facially neutral laws
created to suppress a particular religious practice succeed unless the regulation is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling interest. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
Second, the Smith decision does not apply to the "hybrid cases" in which the law at
issue infringes upon an individual's religious practices as well as another right, such as the
right to free speech or the right of parents to direct the education of their children. Smith,
494 U.S. at 881-82; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (invalidating a compulsory
school attendance law as applied to Amish parents who refused to send their children to
school on religious grounds); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating
a tax on solicitation as applied disseminating religious ideas). See supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text (discussing Yoder); The Court's opinion in Smith does not specify what
level of scrutiny a regulation must withstand when it interferes with hybrid rights, but cites
Yoder as an example of a successful hybrid claim. 494 U.S. at 881. The Yoder court
followed the Sherbert test. 406 U.S. at 220; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21,
§ 17.8 at 1224-26 (describing the Court's application of the balancing test in Yoder); supra
notes 18-21 and accompanying text. Thus, the Sherbert test probably remained the
standard for hybrid claims against neutral laws of general application even before the
RFRA.
Some courts distinguished Smith on the basis of a third exception, holding that the rule
is limited to criminal cases. See American Friends Service Committee Corp. v.
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had been, at least in form, an entire area of First Amendment protec-
tion.52
In the years immediately following Smith, most courts consistently
upheld laws of general applicability against Free Exercise Clause
challenges.53 While under the Sherbert test the Free Exercise Clause
had in form, though generally not in practice, some affirmative power,
under the Smith formula the clause became virtually toothless.5' As a
result, parties who wished to claim that a regulation infringed upon their
rights to the free exercise of religion were forced to resort to state
constitutional guarantees, some of which retained a balancing approach
Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d 1295
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2955 (1992); United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp.
1333 (D.N.M. 1991); Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498,
1514-15 (M.D. Fla. 1991). The majority of jurisdictions, however, apply Smith equally
to civil and criminal contexts. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d
464 (8th Cir. 1991); Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.
1991); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Salvation Army v. Dept. of Community Affairs of New
Jersey, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the
Religious Soc'y of Friends, 753 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Yang v. Stumer,
750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
52. See Laycock, RFRA, supra note 49, at 225 ("Many judges, bureaucrats, and
activists have taken Smith as a signal that the Free Exercise Clause is largely repealed and
that the needs of religious minorities are no longer entitled to any consideration.').
53. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
the argument that a religious symbol in a city's insignia represented "subtle coercion" to
adhere to the majority faith and thereby infringed upon the right to freely exercise other
religions); NLRB v. Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Free Exercise Clause does not protect a Catholic school from unions); Vandiver v. Hardin
County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 934 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not compel a state to give academic credit in public schools to religious home
tutoring); Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 196 (3d
Cir. 1990) (refusing to grant the Salvation Army an exemption to state housing
regulations); In re Chinske, 785 F. Supp. 130, 133-34 (D. Mont. 1991) (holding that a
witness' refusal to testify due to his religious beliefs is not protected by the Free Exercise
Clause); United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends,
753 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that the Free Exercise Clause does not
allow a religious congregation to refuse to pay taxes on the grounds that the funds will
support policies contrary to their beliefs); Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-
Murray High School, 487 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn. 1992) ("In accordance with Smith, we
hold that the right to free exercise of religion does not include the right to be free from
neutral regulatory laws which regulate only secular activities within a church affiliated
institution.').
54. The judicial deference embodied in Smith, however, does have limitations. See
supra note 51.
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similar to the one articulated in Sherbert.55 Some courts, uncertain of
the scope of various exceptions that may be read into the Smith
opinion,' continued to employ the stricter Sherbert test to assess the
validity of regulations facing Free Exercise Clause challenges.5
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
In reaction to the Supreme Court's Smith decision, Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (the RFRA).5" The
legislation was overwhelmingly popular59 and was supported by a
surprisingly broad coalition of political and religious groups.'
The RFRA does not reveal what constitutional power Congress
relied on to enact the legislation. 6 The President, upon signing the act,
presupposed congressional authority to correct the Supreme Court's
55. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Desilets, 663 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994) ("In
interpreting art. 46, § 1 [of the Massachusetts Constitution], we prefer to adhere to the
standards of earlier First Amendment jurisprudence .... ').
56. See supra note 51 (discussing limits on Smith's deferential standard).
57. The courts that take this approach note that if a statute is valid under the Sherbert
test, which imposes some restrictions on generally applicable laws, it surely must be valid
under the more permissive Smith formula. See EEOC v. First Baptist Church, No. S91-
179M, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14479, *21 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 1992) ("Because neither
party has asked the court to decide whether the reasoning of Smith applies to this case, and
the result of this case is the same under either Smith or Sherbert, the court will presume
that the Sherbert balancing test continues to apply.'); State by Cooper v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2, 15-16 n.2 (Minn. 1990) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Smith test
was unnecessary because the challenged antidiscrimination statute was valid under
She-bert).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (Supp. V 1993); see supra note 5 (quoting the
statute).
59. The bill was approved ninety-seven to three in the Senate and passed in the House
by voice vote without objection. Steinfcls, supra note 6.
60. The legislation was cosponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy and Orrin Hatch.
Id. It was supported by a diverse mix of organizations such as the National Association
of Evangelicals, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Islamic Prison
Foundation, B'nai B'rith, the Traditional Values Association, and the People for the
American Way, among others. Vice President Albert Gore, Remarks at the Signing
Ceremony of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (November 16, 1993)
(available in LEXIS, Nexis library). At the signing ceremony, the President suggested that
only divine intervention could explain the broad coalition that supported the bill. President
William Clinton, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (November 16, 1993) (available in LEXIS, Nexis library).
61. See supra note 6 (quoting the statute in fill).
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erroneous interpretations of the Constitution.62 In actuality, Congress'
authority to overrule the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions is not
quite so clear. Since Marbury v. Madison,63 the Court has reaffirmed
its role as the supreme arbiter of the Constitution.' As a result, at least
one court has already questioned whether the RFRA is constitutional.65
Despite this history of the Supreme Court's pre-eminence in the field of
constitutional interpretation, several possible justifications for the statute
exist. The remainder of this Recent Development examines these
justifications and evaluates their ability to sustain the Act against a
constitutional attack.
62. "The power to reverse by legislation a decision of the United States Supreme
Court is a power that is rightly hesitantly and infrequently exercised by the United States
Congress. But this is an issue in which that extraordinary measure was clearly called
for." President William Clinton, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (November 16, 1993) (available in LEXIS, Nexis
library).
63. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
64. See, e.g., PoweU v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[I]t is the
responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that the Supreme Court is the "ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Marbury v.
Madison declared that] the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system").
The framers also believed that the judiciary was the ultimate authority on the meaning
of the Constitution.
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law.
It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body.
TIm FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see
also Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial
Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73 (1993). Even following an original intent theory of
constitutional interpretation does not necessarily mean that the RFRA must be rejected.
The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment (subsequent to the above quote) significantly
altered the role of Congress in enforcing substantive rights. See infra part lI.A.; see also
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) ("The Civil War Amendments themselves worked a dramatic change in the
balance between congressional and state power over matters of race.').
65. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission ex. rel. Bowles, 874 P.2d
274, 280 n.9 (Alaska); cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
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A. The Ratchet Theory: Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
The most obvious candidate for congressional authority to enact the
RFRA is Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.s Indeed, at the
congressional hearings to consider the Act, at least one constitutional
scholar suggested that Section Five would provide the necessary
foundation for the statute.67
How can Congress' authority to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amend-
ment" justify its expanding a First Amendment right beyond the scope
of the Supreme Court's interpretation? Justice Brennan's "ratchet
theory"' 9 provides the answer. The Free Exercise Clause applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.7" Thus, under the ratchet
theory, Congress may enforce the Free Exercise Clause as it pertains to
the states pursuant to Congress' Section Five authority.71
66. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
67. Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights,
Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
141 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1031 n.22 (1993) (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1991: Hearings on HR. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-30 (1992) (statement of
Professor Douglas Laycock)).
Virtually all commentators have also concluded that the RFRA may be enacted under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 895 (1994) [hereinafter
Laycock, Free Exercise] (stating that the RFRA was enacted pursuant to Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Laycock, RFRA supra note 49, at 245 ("Congress has power
to enact RFRA under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Lee, supra note 64 at
90 (stating that the RFRA was enacted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Paws, supra, at 1097 ("[T'he RFRA would clearly be enacted to enforce a Fourteenth
Amendment due process right - the incorporated right to the free exercise of religion.").
68. See supra note 66 (quoting the Fourteenth Amendment).
69. Prof. William Cohen coined this term in William Cohen, Congressional Power to
Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 614 (1975), to
describe Justice Brennan's theory that Congress may expand, but not contract, Fourteenth
Amendment rights pursuant to the Enforcement Clause.
70. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
71. Congress' authority under Section Five does not include the power to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment constraints against the national government, however. See infra
notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court originally articulated the scope of Section Five
in Ex Parte Virginia.' The Court echoed Chief Justice Marshall's
description of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v.
Maryland." Similar to the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Enforce-
ment Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a broad grant of congres-
sional power. This grant of power entitles Congress to a great deal of
judicial deference.
In addition to Congress' extensive power under Section Five, the
language of enforcement clauses in other amendments to the Constitution
is virtually identical.74 Therefore, judicial interpretations of the scope
of those enforcement clauses are logically coextensive with Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment.75
72. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
73. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18, reads: "The Congress shall have the Power... To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."
In McCulloch, the Chief Justice explained the scope of the clause: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adopted to the end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." 17 U.S. at 421.
The Ex Parte Virginia Court explained that Congress' Section Five power encompasses:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions
they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.
100 U.S. at 345-46.
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (same) ; U.S. CONST.
amend XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI ("The Congress and the several
States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.'); U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 2 (same); U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, § 2 (same).
75. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as coextensive.'); see also Lee, supra note
64, at 92 (stating that various Supreme Court opinions indicate that Congress' enforcement
powers under the Civil War Amendments are coextensive).
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In South Carolina v. Kaizenbach,6 for example, the Court found
that the Voting Rights Act of 1965's 7 ban on literacy tests at the polls
was a proper exercise of Congress' enforcement powers under the
Fifteenth Amendment.' Only seven years earlier, however, the Court
held that the Fifteenth Amendment does not, by its own force, prohibit
literacy tests.' Rather than reverse its earlier decision, the Court
reached its conclusion because it found that Congress' remedial powers
under the Enforcement Clause allowed Congress to ban literacy tests. 80
More recently, in City of Rome v. United States, the Court held that
Congress could enact legislation to prohibit voting schemes with
discriminatory effects." In the same term, however, the Court held that
the Fifteenth Amendment, without any legislative action, does not forbid
such voting arrangements.82 The Rome Court employed the appropriate-
ness test from McCulloch and Ex Parte Virginia3 and held that Section
Two of the Fifteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to prohibit
practices beyond those that are barred by Section One alone.' 4
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion regarding Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in Katzenbach v. Morgan.5 Prior
to the decision, New York laws required that all voters read and write
English, 6 and an earlier decision by the Court indicated that such a
76. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
77. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 177
(1988)).
78. 383 U.S. at 337.
79. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
80. 383 U.S. at 325-29.
81. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
82. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). A plurality of four Justices found
no Fifteenth Amendment violation, and Justice Stevens agreed in a separate concurring
opinion. Id. at 61-65, 83-94 (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. See sipra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
84. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177.
It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit
practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as
the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are "appropriate," as that
term is defined in McCulloch v. Maryland and Ex Parte Virginia.
Id. (citation omitted).
85. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
86. Id. at 644 n.2.
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restriction was consistent with the Fourteenth AmendmentY The
Voting Rights Act, however, bars the enforcement of such tests because
Congress found them to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.8
Justice Brennan's opinion upholding the Voting Rights Act rested
upon two alternative rationales. First, Brennan argued that the statute
was Congress' means to implement a judicially determined constitutional
right.8 9 Under this reasoning, the Act was simply an attempt to
ameliorate discriminatory treatment of Puerto Ricans that resulted from
the literacy test requirement.' The scope of the substantive right, under
this rationale, remained the same as it had been under earlier judicial
decisions. The only difference was that Congress found a more effective
method of enforcing the substantive right.
Brennan's second rationale went much farther. Specifically, the
Court indicated that Congress may interpret the Fourteenth Amendment
pursuant to Section Five, and that Congress' interpretation may differ
from the judiciary's.91 Strikingly, this rationale could potentially
undermine the concept of judicial review. 2 If Congress may define the
substance of the Constitution through its enactments, no federal statute
would be unconstitutional. For example, if Congress enacted a statute
that created racially segregated public housing, the Court would have to
uphold the act because it merely reflected Congress' own interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause - that it allowed "separate but equal"
housing units.93
The Morgan holding, however, does not extend quite that far. The
majority carefully limited its holding to affirm only Congress' powef to
87. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-53 (1959).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1988).
89. 384 U.S. at 652-53.
90. Pawa, supra note 67, at 1061.
91. 384 U.S. at 648-51; see 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In effect the
Court reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to define the
substantive scope of the Amendment").
92. Justice Brennan's second rationale, "if carried to its extreme, ... shakes the
foundations of popular understanding ofMarbury v. Madison." Lee, supra note 64, at 93;
see also Pawa, supra note 67, at 1061 (noting that Brennan's approach "might be seen as
endangering the fundamental constitutional principle of Marbury v. Madison').
93. The Supreme Court adopted the "separate but equal" doctrine under equal
protection in Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) and subsequently rejected it
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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expand rights, but admitted no congressional authority to restrict judicial
interpretations of constitutional freedoms. 4  This notion that the
Enforcement Clause allows Congress to ratchet up substantive rights
beyond the scope of their judicial interpretation, but not cut them back,
is known as the "ratchet theory."
The Court has never explicitly endorsed the ratchet theory,'
although on numerous occasions it has given Congress some authority to
substantively interpret the Constitution. In City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co.,9' the Court struck down, as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, a city's plan to award thirty percent of its construction
contracts to minority-owned businesses. Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion distinguished Fullilove v. Klutznick,9" in which the Court found
a similar federal plan to be valid, because Congress adopted the federal
plan under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
O'Connor noted that whereas Congress may act to correct what it
determines to be a threat to equal protection, the Court would not
generally defer to a similar determination by a state or local govern-
ment." The reason that the Court was willing to defer to Congress in
Fulliove, but not to a local government in Croson, is that Section Five
94. 384 U.S. at 651 n.l0.
§ 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and
to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions
of this Court." We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no
power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.
Id. (quoting 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
One potential problem with the distinction between enforcing the due process and equal
protection guarantees, on the one hand, and restricting, abrogating, or diluting those
guarantees on the other, is that in some cases the expansion of one right might cause the
contraction of another. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Unenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1231 (1978). Recognizing this
problem becomes particularly important with respect to the right to free exercise of
religion because an expansion of that right may infringe upon the scope of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text
However, the Court could solve this problem by refusing to allow Congress to expand
rights when such an expansion would interfere with other rights. Pawa, supra note 67, at
1062-63. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 69.
96. Lee, supra note 64, at 94.
97. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
98. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
99. 488 U.S. at 490-92 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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gives only Congress the right to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, Congress gets to decide what the Amendment means."e State
and local governments, on the other hand, cannot interpret the Amend-
ment and thus are subject to the Court's interpretation of it.'"
A year later, the Court, though divided on the outcome of Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC,' unanimously recognized Congress' Section
Five powers, stating the provision gives Congress the authority to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment more expansively than the
courts. 0 3 Thus, although, the Court has never explicitly adopted the
ratchet theory, the theory rests on a solid foundation of modem
constitutional jurisprudence.' °4
For the ratchet theory to justify the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, the Act must fit within the theory's limits. Under the ratchet theory,
Congress' Section Five power has three limitations. 5 First, Congress
may not dilute or restrict a constitutional right recognized by the
Court.10 6 The RFRA expands the right to freely exercise one's reli-
gion. The Act only authorizes restrictions on this right when they further
compelling governmental interests and when the chosen method is the
least restrictive means to further that interest.0 7 This compelling
100. "The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations
which Congress determines threaten the principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic
rules to deal with those situations." Id. at 490 (opinion of O'Connor, .).
101. Justice O'Connor wrote that state and local governments have authority "to
eradicate the effects of private discrimination within [their] jurisdiction[s] [and] within the
constraints of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 491-92 (opinion of O'Connor,
J.). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined in this section of Justice O'Connor's
opinion. Id. at 476.
102. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
103. 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990) (majority opinion); id. at 605-07 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see Laycock, RFRA4, supra note 49, at 248 (noting the Court's unanimity on
this point in Metro Broadcasting).
104. Lee, supra note 64, at 94 ('[The ratchet theory] is fully consistent with the theory
of constitutional jurisprudence since McCulloch.).
105. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970); Laycock, RFRA, supra note
49, at 249.
106. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10; Laycock RFRA, supra note 49, at 249; see supra
note 93 (discussing the "separate but equal" doctrine).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b), quoted supra note 1.
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interest test is stricter than the Court's free exercise standard." 8 Thus,
the RFRA does not run afoul of the first restriction on the ratchet theory.
The ratchet theory's second limitation is that Congress may not use
the Enforcement Clause to expand a right so that it interferes with
another express allocation of power in the Constitution."° For exam-
ple, in Oregon v. Mitchell,"' the Supreme Court partially invalidated
an amendment to the Voting Rights Act"' that reduced the voting age
in state and local elections to eighteen. A majority of the Court found
that the Constitution left the power to determine the qualifications of
voters in state elections to the states." 2 Thus, Congress lacked the
power to lower the voting age for state elections under the Enforcement
Clause."'
At first glance, the RFRA poses a similar threat. The Free Exercise
Clause inherently antagonizes the religious Establishment Clause." 4
To some extent, the expansion of one means the curtailment of the
other."5 The text of the RFRA, however, prohibits its construction
108. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
109. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1980); Laycock, RFRA, supra note
49, at 249.
110. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Ill. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314
(1970).
112. 400 U.S. at 118, 124-31 (opinion of Black, J.); 154-213 (opinion of Harlan, J.);
293-96 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
113. Id.
114. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 17.1, at 1157. The Establishment Clause
reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.' U.S. CoNsT.
amend. I.
115. For example, if a state forbids all prayer in school, it interferes with individual
students' ability to freely exercise their religion. On the other hand, if the state allows
prayer in school, it arguably violates the Constitution's prohibition on the establishment
of religion. See Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has
struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast
in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other.'); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[Tihere are
many situations where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-
on collision with the Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment
Clause.'); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview
and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 948 (1986)
(arguing that the religion clauses are logically irreconcilable). But see Rodney J.
Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285 (1994) (arguing that, correctly
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from interfering with the establishment clause." 6 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,"'
held that religious-based exemptions from otherwise generally applicable
laws do not impermissibly establish a religion. Thus, because the RFRA
in effect creates religious based exemptions from generally applicable
laws, it avoids Establishment Clause problems." 8
The final limitation on Congress' Section Five power is that
Congress may not enact legislation unrelated to the goals of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 9 The Free Exercise Clause is incorporated
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) 20 and
Section Five of the Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce
incorporated rights as well as explicit rights. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, however, only applies to states. 2' But the RFRA purports to
apply to both state and federal law." Thus, while the ratchet theory
provides an adequate basis for Congress to enact the RFRA as it applies
to states and their subdivisions, the ratchet theory does not support the
RFRA as applied to the federal government. A constitutional justifica-
construed, the clauses can be reconciled); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory
of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1378-88 (1981) (same).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4; see supra note 6 (quoting the statute).
117. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
118. The current state of establishment clause jurisprudence is somewhat confused.
For a number of years, the Court followed the "excessive entanglement" test articulated
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In recent establishment cases,
however, the Court has declined to follow the Lemon rule, but has not replaced it with any
other test. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481 (1994) (finding that a religious based school district violates the Establishment
Clause without applying the Lemon test). Two commentators have applied the test to the
RFRA - with opposite conclusions. Compare Pawa, supra note 67, at 1098-99 (applying
the Lemon test and finding that a RFRA-based exemption from a generally applicable law
would not violate the Establishment Clause) with Blackman, supra note 115, at 402 n.400
(applying the test and finding a violation). Nevertheless, the majority in Kiryas Joel cited
Amos with approval. 114 S. Ct. at 2492. So long as Amos remains good law, the RFRA
does not violate the establishment clause.
119. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 49, at 249-50.
120. See supra note 16. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. See supra note 120.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a). See supra note 6 (quoting statute).
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tion for applying the RFRA to federal law must come from another
source.
B. The Admiralty Analogy
A second possible source of Congress' power to enact the RFRA
can be found in a comparison to the source of Congress' authority to
enact admiralty laws. Congress' power to legislate over matters of
admiralty law is well established."z The Constitution, however, does
not explicitly authorize Congress to enact admiralty legislation. 4
Originally, the Supreme Court held that Congress had no independent
admiralty power"z but indicated that maritime legislation was valid
pursuant to Congress' authority over interstate and foreign com-
merce. 1
2
Later, the Commerce Clause basis for legislation gave way to an
understanding of an independent admiralty power. In 1886, Congress
amended the Limited Liability Act to encompass all vessels on navigable
waters of the United States, whether the waters were inter-, or intra-
state. 27  Late nineteenth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence 121
generally held that Congress did not have the authority to regulate
123. FRNK L. MARArsT, ADmrRALTY IN A NUTsHELL 5 (1988).
124. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (listing the powers of Congress).
125. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,292 (1849) (opinion of McLean, J.).
126. In The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 10 (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) the majority invoked the
commerce power to sustain a federal statute that effectively imposed licensing require-
ments on intrastate shipping. Id. at 563-64. The opinion made no mention of any
independent federal admiralty authority, which would have made its discussion of the
commerce power unnecessary. Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The
Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1232 (1954); see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.').
127. Act of June 19, 1886, ch. 421, 24 Stat. 79 (1886) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
128. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (noting that
internal state commerce lies outside the bounds of Congress' power); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (finding a distinction between "national" and
"local" subjects of regulation); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 44 (1870)
("[The Commerce Clause is] a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal
trade and business of the separate states ... ."); The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96-97
(1878) (holding that Congress exceeds its commerce power when it does not exempt
entirely intrastate commercial transactions from a regulatory scheme).
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intrastate commerce. Nevertheless, in In re Garnett' the Supreme
Court declared the Limited Liability Act valid under the separate
admiralty grant.
1 30
The Court found a basis for the congressional power in Congress'
authority to define the scope of the federal judiciary's appellate
jurisdiction.'3 ' Article III, Section Two, Clause One of the Constitu-
tion gives the judiciary the power to hear admiralty cases.'32 The
judiciary's power to hear cases involving admiralty flows from its
129. 141 U.S. 1 (1891).
130. The court held:.
It is unnecessary to invoke the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, in order to find authority to pass the
law in question. The act of Congress which limits the liability of ship owners was
passed in amendment of the maritime law of the country, and the power to make
such amendments is coextensive with that law. It is not confined to the boundaries
or class of subjects which limit and characterize the power to regulate commerce; but,
in maritime matters, it extends to all matters and places to which the maritime law
extends.
Id. at 12.
The Court had indicated earlier that it might find an independent admiralty power. In
Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889), the majority found that
because "the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to 'all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' and as this jurisdiction is held to be exclusive, the
power of legislation on the same subject must necessarily be in the national legislature and
not in the state legislature." Id. at 557.
In Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847), the Court refused to limit the
national government's admiralty jurisdiction to that recognized under English law at the
time the Constitution was adopted, although 'many in the first half [of the nineteenth]
century thought admiralty constitutionally bound by the limits of its 1789 English
counterpart." Note, supra note 126, at 1230-31. The Waring Court rejected that view in
part because "[i]t would be a denial to Congress of all legislation upon the subject. It
would make... a limitation which never could have been meant...." 46 U.S. (5 How.)
at 457.
Modem cases cite Waring as the earliest Court articulation of a separate admiralty
power. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 41 (1942).
But see Note, supra note 126, at 1231 (arguing that Waring should not be read to
recognize a distinct congressional admiralty power).
131. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1923) ("Although containing
no express grant of legislative power over the substantive [maritime] law, [Art. III, § 2,
cl. 1] was regarded from the beginning as implicitly investing such power in the United
States [Congress].").
132. "The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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appellate jurisdiction. 13  The scope of appellate jurisdiction is defined
by Congress.'" Thus, the purpose of Congress' admiralty power is to
define the scope of the judiciary's authority to review maritime legisla-
tion. When Congress passes a maritime law it is technically precluding
judicial review of the Act's constitutionality. Maritime legislation
involves a very selective removal of jurisdiction. Courts may review a
maritime act on all other issues except whether Congress had the power
to enact it in the first place. 35 As a result of this backdoor approach,
Congress may legislate as if it had an explicit admiralty power.'36
Could this argument also justify a congressional power to interpret
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause? The admiralty argument rests on
the premise that the judiciary's jurisdiction over an area of law, coupled
with Congress' ability to define the scope of the courts' appellate
jurisdiction, grants Congress the ability to legislate in that area. Like
admiralty, the power to decide whether a law violates the Free Exercise
Clause falls under the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.137
Congress has the power to define the scope of the Court's review. This
power in turn allows Congress to confine the Court's substantive review
and interpretation. Therefore, if the admiralty argument extends to other
133. "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction
.... " U.S. CONST. art. I1, §2, cl. 2.
134. "The supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction... with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 2.
Although that clause only authorizes Congress to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, other provisions extend that power over lower federal courts. See U.S.
CONST. art. HIL, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To
constitute Tribunals inkfior to the supreme Court.').
135. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932) ("In amending and revising the
maritime law, the Congress cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are
inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.").
136. See, e.g., Panama R.R. Co., 264 U.S. at 388 ("Congress is empowered by [Art.
m, § 2, cl. 1] to alter, qualify or supplement the maritime rules....'").
Three limitations restrict Congress' admiralty power. First, Congress may only legislate
on matters clearly within the boundaries of admiralty law. Id. at 386. Second, admiralty
legislation must apply uniformly throughout the United States. Id. at 386-87. Finally, the
Constitution places limits on admiralty legislation. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 55.
137. The Court derives this jurisdiction from U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1-2; see
supra notes 132-34 (discussing these provisions).
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areas of the law, Congress has an implied "free exercise power"'38 that
justifies its enactment of the RFRA.
Applying the argument beyond admiralty, either to free exercise or
diversity,139 could have profound consequences on our system of
government. 40 Unlike the ratchet theory, which only allows legislative
interpretations of the Constitution that expand constitutional guaran-
tees, 14 an implied free exercise power has no such boundary. Taken
to its logical extreme, such a power could enable Congress to dilute or
even delete the Free Exercise Clause.
Thus, the admiralty argument, if applied to other areas of the law,
could undermine both the doctrine of judicial review 142 and the
judiciary's exclusive role as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.143
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court never extended the admiralty
argument beyond maritime law.144  Indeed, while some evidence
indicates that the framers intended Congress to have the power to enact
admiralty laws,145 even stronger evidence shows that the framers
138. In theory, the admiralty argument could be used to create a congressional power
over any constitutional right, because the judiciary has appellate jurisdiction over all
constitutional claims, except those that happen to arise involving ambassadors, ministers,
consuls, or states. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, quoted supra note 133.
139. Some commentators have suggested that the same logic could be used to create
a "diversity power." Such a power would arise by applying the same reasoning that
resulted in recognition of Congress' admiralty power by virtue of the admiralty clause in
Art. El, § 2, cl. 1 to the Diversity Clause, which provides that "[t]he judicial power shall
extend.., to controversies ... between citizens of different states." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1. Under a diversity power, Congress "could create rules of law on any subject
that might arise in a diversity action - that is, any subject whatsoever." Martha A. Field,
Sources of the Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 918
(1986); see id. at 915-19 (discussing the bases for and ramifications of recognizing a
diversity power); Note, supra note 126, at 1235 (same).
140. Legal commentators have largely ignored the possibility that the an analogy to
admiralty law may justify an expansion of congressional lawmaking ability in other
directions. But see Note, supra note 126, at 1235, n.155 (citing GOODNOW, SOCIAL
REFORM AmD TBE CoNsTmmoN 150-202 (1911)).
141. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
142. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the power
of judicial review).
143. See supra note 64.
144. Note, supra note 126, at 1235 (explaining why the admiralty argument has not
been extended to recognize a diversity power).
145. Id., citing Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 566 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe need for a body of maritime law, applicable throughout the Nation...
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intended the judiciary, not Congress, to define the scope of individual
constitutional rights." It is unlikely that the Court would ever extend
the admiralty argument because doing so would dilute its own authority
and radically redefine constitutional jurisprudence.
C. The Commerce Clause
Another possible justification for the RFRA, as it applies to federal
law, is the interstate commerce power. 47 Although Congress cannot
use the power to define the Constitution differently than the Supreme
Court, the commerce power might allow Congress to create an indepen-
dent statutory right.'4 If enacted pursuant to the commerce power, the
RFRA might create a statutory right to freely exercise one's religion that
goes beyond the minimal free exercise standard required by the
Constitution.
The commerce power justification for the RFRA is entirely
plausible. Congress' Commerce Clause power is extremely broad 49
and justifies noneconomic as well as economic regulations. 5 Con-
was recognized by every shade of opinion at the Philadelphia Convention.').
146. See supra note 64. "[S]o important an assignment of legislative power could not
fairly be hung on so inconspicuous a peg." Henry 3. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 394 (1964). Judge Friendly
was not refurring to the prospect of a congrssional diversity power under the admiralty
argument, but his statement applies equally well here.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see supra note 130.
148. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988).
Congress explicitly invoked its commerce power in § I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141.
Section 1 provides in part that "[i]t is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to
promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations affecting commerce ....
149. See, e.g., Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445,450 (9th Cir. 1989) ('The Commerce
Clause forms the broadest base of congressional power."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990).
150. "The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction
and over which the courts are given no control." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
115 (1941). For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), the Supreme Court held that the Congress "possessed ample power" under the
Commere Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in a privately-owned motel. Id. at 250.
Although the statute contained substantial findings concerning the effects of discrimination
on interstate commerce, the Court noted that "the fundamental object of Title II was to
vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denial of equal
access to public establishments.'" Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at
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gress may legislate under its commerce power in three circumstances:
by regulating goods or services that travel interstate,' by integrating
a nexus with commerce element into a statute, 5 2 or by regulating an
activity that affects interstate commerce.5 3 Religion is not necessarily
a service that travels between state lines,"5 and the RFRA contains no
explicit nexus with commerce requirement."5s Therefore, in order for
the commerce power to provide a suitable foundation for the RFRA, the
exercise of religion must be an activity that affects commerce.
Determining whether every religious practice affects commerce
would be a daunting task. Even under a very broad understanding of
"affecting commerce," some religions may not affect commerce. 56 In
Perez v. United States,157 however, the Supreme Court held that an
activity may be regulated under the commerce power if that activity as
a class affects commerce, regardless of whether individual members of
the class by themselves affect commerce.'58 Religions as a class have
16-17 (1964)); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II
as applied to a restaurant because the food it served once travelled in interstate commerce).
151. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1988) (prohibiting the import or export of narcotics).
152. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) (prohibiting the possession of a firearm that
is "in or affecting commerce"); United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir.
1989) (interpreting "affecting commerce" language of § 922(g) as a proper invocation of
Congress' broad power under the Commerce Clause).
153. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding a regulation of
individual instances of a class of activities that as a whole affect commerce). For a more
detailed discussion of Perez, see infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
154. One could imagine circumstances in which religious practices could be viewed
as interstate operations. Most religious organizations exist in more than one state or
engage in activities that cross state lines. However, if justification for the RFRA rested
on this prong of the commerce power, it would leave those smaller religions that happen
to be located entirely within one state's borders (for example, a Polynesian religion
practiced only in Hawaii) outside of its protective zone. This would undermine the
RFRA's purpose of shielding minority religions from laws that burden their religious
expression.
155. See supra note 6 (quoting the RFRA).
156. See supra note 154.
157. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
158. Id. at 154. "Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the
reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual
instances' of the class." Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
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a profound effect on interstate commerce."5 9 Thus, religion meets the
Perez "class of activities" test. Although religion's connection with
commerce is purely hypothetical, it is sufficient under the Court's
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause."
Unlike other statutes enacted under the affecting commerce prong
of Congress' commerce power, the RFRA contains nothing to indicate
that Congress found a connection between commerce and religion. 6'
However, Congress need not make particularized findings about the
relationship between a class of activities and interstate commerce in order
to legislate. 62 Thus, even though the RFRA does not even mention
the word "commerce,"" it is a valid exercise of Congress' power to
create a statutory right to the free exercise of religion.
The ability to create a statutory right that goes beyond a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution is analogous to Congress' powers in
enforcing the Civil War Amendments.'" The statutory right is en-
forceable only if it expands protection already given by the Constitution,
but not if it attempts to restrict, abrogate, or dilute a constitutional
guarantee'6 For example, if Congress enacted a law that fined anyone
who did not believe in God, the statute would clearly violate the Free
Exercise Clause, even under the permissive standards articulated in
Smith.' 66 Labelling such a restrictive provision as a new statutory right
would do nothing to sustain it. Clearly, however, Congress' ratcheting-
up of the extremely deferential Smith standard expands constitutional
rights, allowing the RFRA to pass this last barrier.
159. Most religious organizations operate interstate. Interstate shipment of religious
books and ceremonial items fiarther provides the necessary relationship between interstate
commerce and religion as a class.
160. NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 21, § 4.8, at 154-55.
161. See supra note 6 (quoting the RFRA); cf., e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988) (finding
a connection between commerce and local utility companies).
162. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 156 ("Congress need [not] make particularized findings
in order to legislate."). But cf United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995)
("[C]ongressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative jdugment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce....").
163. See supra note 6 (quoting the RFRA).
164. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
165. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. See supra note 94.
166. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 ("The government may not compel affirmation of
religious belief.").
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I. CONCLUSION
Congress had the power to enact the RFRA. As it applies to state
and local government, the RFRA represents a valid exercise of Congress'
Section Five enforcement powers. As applied to the federal government,
the Act creates a statutory right to free exercise of religion under
Congress' commerce power.
One should not rely on the Congress to cure every restrictive
constitutional interpretation. Such legislation has serious disadvantages.
First, statutes can always be repealed. Thus, individual rights become
subject to the whims of the political process. 67 Furthermore, such
statutes change an issue of constitutional interpretation into one of
statutory construction. Therefore, after a statutory correction of a
decision, the judiciary never gets the opportunity to undo its earlier
constitutional error.16
Nevertheless, the RFRA is an instance where congressional
intervention is justified. The Act's wide base of support, cutting across
party lines, renders its repeal unlikely. 69 So long as the RFRA
remains in place, the Court's inability to overrule Smith makes no
practical difference.
The RFRA purports to restore free exercise jurisprudence to its pre-
Smith condition.170 It is not a restoration of the Sherbert era - when
courts claimed to apply a compelling interest test that, in practice,
resembled rational basis review.' 7' Judging from the few cases that
have been decided under the Act, the RFRA creates a compelling interest
167. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 49, at 254; see also Laycock, Free Exercise, supra
note 67, at 897 ("That means that if an unpopular religion prevails in court and Congress
gets excited enough about it, Congress can amend the statute to cut that religion out").
168. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 49, at 254.
169. See supra notes 59-60 (discussing the RFRA's wide base of support).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1); supra note 6 (quoting the RFRA).
171. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing results in pre-RFRA free
exercise cases); see also Ryan, supra note 3, at 1412 ("Mhe free exercise claimant...
rarely succeeded under the compelling interest test, despite some powerful claims.').
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standard the courts will take seriously."n With the RFRA, Congress
has successfully used its authority to remedy a damaging court decision.
Jeremy Meyer'
172. Of the 16 RFRA cases reported by January, 1995, five courts decided in favor
of the party asserting a free exercise claim, eleven against. Cases ruling in favor of the
free exercise claimant include: Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24160 (9th Cir. Sept 2, 1994); Smith v. Elkins, No. 93-15185, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4293 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 1994); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994); Powell v. Stafford, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1275 (D. Colo. 1994); Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Cases ruling against the free exercise claimant include: Bryant v. Gomez, No. 94-15178,
1995 WL 34272 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1995); Merritt-Bey v. Delo, No. 93-2194, 1994 WL
263780 (8th Cir. June 17, 1994); Robinson v. Koch, No. Civ. A. 94-1993, (E.D. Pa. Jan.
23, 1995); Levinson-Roth v. Pavvies, No. CIVIL L-91-3668, 1995 WL 10740 (D. Md. Jan.
5, 1995); Reily v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994); Bates v. Oregon Department
of Correction, No. 93-674-FR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11423 (D. Ore. Aug. 11, 1994);
Prins v. Coughlin, 94 Civ. 2053 (MBM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10564 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
2, 1994); Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, No. 94-
1633, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994); Boone v. Commissioner
of Prisons, No. 93-5074, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10027 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994); Council
for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994); Allah v. Beyer, No. 92-
0651, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14340 (D.NJ. Mar. 29, 1994); United States v. Brock, 863
F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n ex rel
Bowles (Alaska), 874 P.2d 274, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
Although it may be too early to obtain an accurate sample, the decisions cited indicate
that a post-RFRA claimant has approximately a 31% chance of success. In the ten years
immediately preceding Smith, claimants succeeded only 12% of the time. See Ryan, supra
note 3, at 1412.
* J.D. 1995, Washington University.
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